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FOREWORD 
Because Gerald Bailey's lectures, given at Earlham 
College soon after the climactic days of the Cubark 
crisis in the fall of 1962, were so illuminating to 
those privileged to hear them, Earlham College is 
now making them available to the reading public. 
Gerald Bailey is a distinguished British Quaker who 
has served long on the East-West Committee of 
hndon Yearly Meeting of Friends and has r e p  
resented Friends on many occasions as a part of the 
non-governmental group at the Assembly of the 
United Nations. Gerald Bailey has visited main- 
land China since the establishment of the Com- 
munist government and has been, many times, in 
the Soviet Union. He is, perhaps, the most widely 
travelled Friend of our generation. 
Landrum R. Bolling 
President 
Earlham College fi 
dc? rl 
. .I 
- - 
Thq lectures reproduced here were delivered 
at Ear- College, Richmond, Indian& ih Novem? 
ber 1362. They had been largely prepmed fo* 
months earlier but two weeks before-they were' 64 
fivered the East-West crisis over Cuba arase and 
it was necessary to insert references to these eventg 
and their implications. These revisions were ma* 
Im the immediate aftermath of the crisis but I have 
found no reason to change them materially and, irj 
fact,- liave left them substantidly as they werh 
spoken. -I take this opportunity of expressing my 
katitude to the President aiid faculty of Earlha6 
for the indtation to give these talks in the seriq 
bf Lilly Lectures on Religion and Politics and foe 
the great pleasure and stimulus I derived from my 
visit. 
G. B* 
January, 1963. 
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Chapter 1 
THE PROPHET AND THE RECONCILER 
I want to think aloud for a short time this morning on 
an aspect of the age-long problem of religion and politics, 
or, to be more precise, on the interplay of the relative and 
the ideal in the field of international politics and interna- 
tional peace-making. And since basically the subject is 
as old as politics if not as old as religion, and certainly as 
old as the Society of Friends, I shall not attempt to discuss 
it at the historical and philosophical levels where I would 
have little that is new or pertinent to say. Setting my 
sights much more modestly, I propose to relate the question 
quite strictly to our present situation and to some of the 
predicaments which confront those who desire to make 
a reality of their religious confessions and convictions in 
the contemporary world. I also want to relate the question 
to a debate, if debate is the right word in this case, which 
has been going on intermittently over the last year or two 
within the Quaker movement in my own country, that is 
in the London Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends. 
Though the terms are only partially appropriate, the issue 
has become crystallized there under the title The Prophet 
and the Reconciler, and the essential question it raises is: 
what happens to our perfectionist ideals, our absolute and 
uncompromising standards when they are brought down 
into the dusty, even dirty, arena of politics and.power, of 
government and the implications of government; when 
they are brought face to face, that is, not with things & 
we would have them be but with things as they are? Must 
we take our perfectionist ethics, our absolute aims and 
ideals into the inevitably relative power situations with 
which international politics must deal? And if we do so 
take them, should we expect to maintain them unsullied 
and uncompromised in the process? Furthermore, can we 
set the limits of compromise just where it suits us to set 
them? Can we be, as it were, in and out of the political 
business of peace-making? Can we be prophet and recon- 
ciler at one and the same time? 
So far, I must say, the articulate and authoritative 
voices in my own Yearly Meeting have given an affirmative 
answer to this last question. W. Grigor McClelland, speak- 
ing to the Yearly Meeting of 1960 in London, not only re- 
jected any insoluble contradiction between the two roles 
but saw them as necessarily and desirably fused in the 
spirit and the action of each and every person committed 
to a Christian profession of peace. The prophet, as McClel- 
land defines him, "devotes himself to preaching the unilat- - 
era1 abandonment of arms as a moral duty. 4?e is engaged 
on a crusade to bring to his fellowmen a consciousness that 
war is wrong. He calls them whether as humble citizens 
or as national leaders to cast away all arms, come what ' 
may." The reconciler, on the other hand, "devotes him- 
self to working for the establishment of conditions in which :n 
people will feel no need to rely upon arms because they do ,' 
not feel threatened. He seeks to relax tensions, to promote 
meetings of persons and meetings of minds, to suggest ac- 
ceptable solutions for divisive problems." "We are tempted 
to assert," McClelland continues, "that between these two 
extremes, the one claiming to be realist, the other to be 
moral, there can be no halfway house that is not the prod- ' 
uct either of confusion or of opportunism. This is to make 
a grave mistake." And a little later concluding his lecture, 
he says, "The truth is that we are all called to both voca- 
tions, that of the prophet and that of the reconciler, neither 
of them as an end in itself but both as a by-product of 
Christian inspirations and Christian living." 
Delivering under the title Buldihg the Institutions of 
Peace, the annual Swarthmore Lecture, prior to the Yearly 
Meeting of 1962, yet another colleague of mine, Duncan 
Wood, reached, if in somewhat vaguer and more cautious , 
terms, a not dissimilar conclusion. "The message we .have , 
to deliver," he said in a concluding chapter, "both to the 
world and to the rulers of it has its temporal md eternal 
aspects. Most of the topics that we have considered so 
far belong to the realm of time." He was referring here, 
let me interpolate, to his own discussion of the problems 
and possibilities of the United Nations and of the impli- : 
cations of the East-West and North-South problems. And 
he added: "These temporal problems may seem remote from 
the historic peace testimony of the Society of Friends 
which belongs to the realm of eternity. This is not so. Who 
can tell to what extent man's undoubted progress towards 
international peace is due to the prophetic message that . 
such peace is possible? Is it not conceivable that without 
the intervention of foolish prophets, the wise world might 
now be rushing to destruction like lemmings in a year of 
, 
abundance unaware of any alternative destination?" "The , 
peace testimony," he adds, "will continue to give meaning 
and inspiration to our message for today and it loses none of ; 
its validity, if to the uncompromising negative of our re- $ 
$i :* i 
fusal to bear arms, we add a demand for a positive commit- 
ment to the international ideal." 
There are two assumptions here, incidentally, which 
I find unwarranted, namely that only the prophets believe 
peace to be possible and that if it was not for the prophets 
and the pacifists we should have destroyed ourselves by 
this time in global thermo-nuclear war. But the core of 
the matter is whether, as I shall ask in a moment, "the 
uncompromising negative of the refusal to bear arms7'- 
a symbolic term by the way these days-is, in fact, "com- 
patible with a positive commitment to the international 
idea," if this last is to involve more than a vague preference 
for internationalism and peace. However, befbre I join 
in the discussion myself, let me emphasize that there is 
no dispute as to the validity of both the roles of prophet 
and of reconciler. Nor is there any question, at least in my 
own mind, that the world has need of both, has room and 
need of both the prophetic and the reconciling tasks. Either 
from a point of detachment outside or maybe from with- 
in the arena itself, we can prophetically proclaim the 
message of total pacifism - of integral peace - the mes- 
sage as the beloved Canon Sheppard in England used to 
define it, not of "peace at any price but love at all costs." 
Recognizing with a Quaker statement issued in the year 
of the Battle of Trafalgar - in 1805, that is - that "it is an 
awful thing to stand forth to the nation as the advocate of 
an inviolable peace," we can so stand forth according to the 
faith and the vision and the courage we possess;. We can 
opt for total military defenselessness for ourselves and our 
nation. We can repudiate as an inflexible principle all re- 
liance on military force or military pressure whether for 
"deterrence" or for use. We can reject all use of coercive 
power in international relations and opt for the exclusive 
dependence on non-violent resistance and moral suasion 
that total pacifism demands. We can resolutely refuse to 
surrender any part or portion of the ideal for which we 
stand. We can do this despite the possible consequences, 
for ourselves anyway, if we have, I would say, honestly 
and fearlessly faced them. "Here stand I," we can say, "I 
can do no other." 
On the other hand we can equally well and equally 
honourably be reconcilers in the sense that the term is here 
used. We can busy ourselves, as indeed I have been doing 
in the last few weeks in New York, with Duncan Wood's 
"temporal problems." We can wrestle with the day-to-daq 
- '  l o 1 -  
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issues in international relations set out in the agendas of 
the United Nations. We can seek to harmonize the con- 
flicting aims of nations, to reduce tensions whether between 
East and West or' North and South. We can LjOlvolve our- 
selves in the highly complex questions of applied and 
agreed disarmament. We can face, that is to sag: the pre- 
cise tasks the governments and the statesmen have to face 
and share with them in some degree the hopes and fears, 
the accommodations and the compromises involved. Aml 
hoking objectively at these roles we can not only vindi- 
cate and justify both but agree, too, that each has nee& 
of the other. "The relativist," says Frederick Tolles ha 
his -Ward Lecture Quakerism and Politics, "needs the ab- 
solutkt to keep aliveand clear the vision of God while h6 
struggles -in someameatsure to realize it in the City of Earth; 
And conversely, the absolutist needs the relativist lest the. 
vision remain the-possession of a few only - untranslated 
into any degree of reality for the world as a whole." 
The roles then, we can a@ee, are c 0 ~ ~ 1 e m e n t a r ~ .  But 
if we choose to be reconcilers, if we choose to concern our- 
selves with the ,temporal problems,, to spend opr time 
energy : wrestling. 'with -practical inte-ional' issues. and- 
involving ourselves nece's~pily therefore in, the businesq 
of state&ship and statecraft,' then it eseems clear to me 
we must face the implications of. the choice. We, must, face,' 
fra&cIy, t& nature of government and of politics and, the 
responsibilities and limitations- that go .with them. We 
must acknoprledge that there are, :in fact, -no short cuts 
to the avoidance of w+r and the assurance of peke, that, 
there are indeed no simple and clear-cut solutions to many- 
if not all, the major international probleqns of our time. I 
believe it was Alfred North Whitehead prho said, "In publie. 
affairs the simple solutions are invariably the wrong sw 
lutions." Indeed we have to recognize that some practical 
questions in the international field ar6 simply not solvable- 
within given circumstances or within given time. They 
are not, in fact, problems at all in the sense that they lmve 
discoverable solutions in the mathematical sense. I re- 
member a wise Englishman, Nathaniel Micklem, pointkg 
out in an essay on politics and religion that there is na 
ready-to-hand solution, for example, of the Arab-Israeli 
tension, for it is an estrangement not an intellectual puzzle. 
"We may say," he adds, "if we think it useful, that if only 
Arabs and Jews would all become Christians or Buddhists 
or would acce~t he ideas and the ideals of Thomas Arnold 
of EtugbyP .the& difficulties and dissensions would disappear. 
So, no doubt they would; but as politicians we must deal 
with people who are neither Christians nor Buddhists, and 
very rarely wear old school ties." 
We have to go further than this, however, I suggest, 
and recognize that the responsibility .of individual persons 
must not be confused and cannot simply be identified with 
the collective responsibility of the nation and of the states- 
men who lead it. There can be martyr individuals certaidy 
but not a martyr nation - a nation accepting martyrdom 
voluntarily, that is, except in the virtually impossible cir- 
cumstance that all the people or at least a great majority 
of them, have freely and fully accepted the implications 
of martyrdom and want to endure them. "Nations made 
up of unregenerate persons cannot," as Vernon Holloww 
put it, "act like a community of love." Or to put it another 
way: there may be no insoluble dilemmas for the individual. 
There may be no enforced choice of evils, no enforced 
choice of the less than ideal for him, since he can claim 
that God will always show him a better way th~ugh  not 
necessarily an easier one. But the nation is not similarly 
placed. It cannot escape the relativity of history nor the 
political choices within history, nor can the statesmen ac- 
cept the responsibility for the consequences of the decisions 
they take in its name. Nor, if we move into the realm of 
political and practical peace-making can we overlook the 
nature of the nation-state system itself which, pending the 
realization of a fully-organized world community, is the in- 
escapable framework of international relations in which we 
have to operate. We cannot in these circumstances escape 
from the considerations of power or the calculations of 
power any more than can the state itself or the statesmen. 
We cannot just wish the element of power, and therefore of 
coercion, out of existence. To do so, or to attempt to do so, 
is not to be uncompromised; it is to nullify ourselves in the 
very process in which we are engaged. 
Now we have had perhaps a graphic, a dramatic il- 
lustration of this problem in the events of these last days. 
I do not want to involve myself here and now in political 
judgements as to the rightness or inevitability of the action 
the President of the United States took a short time ago in 
respect to the newly discovered build-up of Soviet offensive 
military power in Cuba. I think future events, future 
history may well confirm that this was an epoch-making 
action, a turning-point in history, in which the Soviet 
Union and the United States got off, as it were, the collision 
I . .  
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course on which they were travelling and at the same 
time made possible, perhaps for the first time, a realistic 
and practical and productive approach to a solution of the 
issues that divide them. This hope will @, of course, 
materialize unless there is a sustained will to make it 
materialize on both sides; a sustained readiness to reach 
firm and honourable agreements and above all to reduce 
and eventually eliminate the - as we have seen - deadly 
peril of a nuclear arms race. But the point is that this 
reinforcement, as I think it may prove to be, of the hopes 
of peace has resulted essentially from the willingness of 
the United States - let us be quite blunt about this - to 
go not merely up to but beyond the point that might have 
loosed a thesmo-nuclear disaster on the world. It was not 
enough to go up to the brink with the declared or unde- 
clared intention of withdrawing in face of a threat of coun- 
ter-force. The bluff, if bluff it was, would have been called. 
It was necessary, in brief, to risk war for the sake of peace 
and the refusal to do so might well, in the circumstances 
as they are, have made war sooner or later inevitable. The 
prophet - the integral pacifist - and indeed the recon- 
ciler too, can and must insist that the deployment of mili- 
tary power or the threat of war, while it may postpone or 
prevent war, cannot of itself or without much else, remove 
our perils and guarantee our peace. But he cannot claim 
or affirm that in the desperate choices the President had 
to make, there was any course open to him that was risk- 
free, or ideal, or that given the circumstances the choice 
made was not, for the President, inescapable and right. 
The issue is presented scarcely less acutely if one turns 
to the two related purposes in which incidentally both 
prophet and reconciler have equal concern - the related 
tasks of achieving total national disarmament and establish- 
ing some kind of world system of security and peace. 
Negotiation of an arms treaty, however prolonged and 
difficult, remains the only practical route to a disarmed 
world. It involves essentially, however, the maintenance 
of an approximate parity of military power between the 
parties at all stages of the process from the first reduction 
to the final achievement of complete disarmament. Any 
substantial unilateral disarmament on the part of any of 
the major parties to a disarmament discussion would 
destroy in all probability or indefinitely postpone, the 
hopes of an agreed and negotiated disarmament treaty. 
We can advocate, therefore, or pursue one policy or the 
other - total unilateral disarmament or multilateral dis- 
armament by agreement. We cannot, I believe, pursue both 
policies at the same time. And is there any doubt that the 
way to the complete disarmament of the nation-state and 
the elimination of the arbitrary exercise of power by the 
single nation, is in the pooling of power in the hands of 
an acceptable international authority? Can this, too, be 
reconciled with the requirements of a total and unequivo- 
cal non-reliance upon force - an unswerving and unquali- 
fied adherence to the way of love and of peaceful persua- 
sion? 
Faced with these questions and the necessity to answer 
them, I have come reluctantly and not without much exer- 
cise of spirit, to the conclusion that for my part anyway 
and in the light of the vision I possess at present, I cannot 
claim to be at one and the same time prophet and reconciler 
in any adequate and meaningful interpretation of these 
terms. I have come to doubt whether, to put it colloquially, 
we can have it both ways. It seems to me manifest that once 
by our own deliberate choice we have committed our ideals 
- our absolutist and perfectionist ideals - to the demands. 
&f the political scene, to what Rufus Jones once called "the 
tender mercies of a world not yet ripe for them," we cannot 
by the same token pretend or insist that they be maintained 
unchanged or unimpaired. Once so submitted they become 
affected inexorably by the conditions governing political 
action and political change in the international sphere - 
unless we are to say, surely indefensibly, that these con- 
ditions are for the statesman or for the government, but. 
not for us. I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that 
we cannot. I have reached this conclusion, I repeat, with 
not a little travail of spirit, recognizing that the implica- 
tions are deep and far-reaching and that they face me with 
dilemmas hardly less acute than those I claim to have re- 
solved. It is in any case a personal decision which I can- 
not and would not wish to impose on any who are listening 
to me. Certainly the last thing I would want to do is to 
discourage anyone here of assuming the role of the prophet 
if he or she has the urge and the determination and the 
courage to do so. But I beg you not to minimize the role. 
I beg you to recognize that the prophetic role makes tre- 
mendous, if not total, claims upon you; that it claims the 
obligation to set all human relations, not merely the issue 
of peace and war, on the basis of sacrificial love. "It is 
not consistent for anyone," said an English Quaker Confer- 
ence of 1920, "to claim that his Christianity as a way of life 
stops him from war unless he is prepared to adjust his 
entire We, in its personal aspirations, in its relations with 
his fellows, in its pursuit of truth, in its economic and 
social bearings, in its political obligations, in its religioUS 
fellowships, in its intercourse with God, to the tremendous 
demands of God's way." I w- 
This is indeed a pretentious vocation, perhaps the great- 
est i d  noblest of all. Go to it if you must and can! But 
if, on the other hqd ,  you opt for the role of the reconciler, 
if you decide to enter the arena of international political 
action, do not, I beg you, be apologetic despite the inen- 
sistencies and compromises in which you will be involved. 
Do not presume that it will not pr6sent moral challenges 
too. Do not presume that the approach based on religious 
realism, for which 1 q n  appealing, makes the task any less 
a murd task. In the same l e r e  from which I quoted 
earlier, M e & k  Toll- has this to say of the 18th century 
Quaker mkrs  of Pennsylv@a: ''In some degree everyone 
d thegn had:-me to terms with the world, had compre 
m h d  the purity of his reggious, testimony ai a Quaker. 
&at they had mated i n  t& Aplerican wilderness 'a co&-' 
monwealth in which civil aqd religious likrty, sociql and 
political qquality, domestic and external peace h@ reigpe'd 
#a a degree and for a length of tkne une-$iid i6 the 
history of - the Westew world,". If h God's good 'ti?& aqd 
withi God's help the recgncilers can create, in the wild@mesi 
which is ~ U E  wo~Ld-$odey, a worldqvide coquhonwealtth iq 
which these same valzes aqi  conditiopq prevail, they , - .  wilJ .
have I$ttle or qthing for which to apologize, 
Chapter 2 
THIS SIDE IDOLATRY 
Since I shall have a good deal to say in these remarks 
about the complaints and criticisms currently levelled 
against the United Nations in my own country and in the 
United States, I would begin with a simple statement of 
my own credo in respect of the world organization. For 
me a sufficient justification for the United Nations is the 
fact that - to quote the oft-used phrase - if the United 
Nations did not exist it would be indispensable to create 
it. It is obvious, it seems to me, that we cannot get along 
without disaster in the growingly interdependent world 
of today without some form of universally-based and uni- 
versally-composed international organization harmonizing 
or attempting to harmonize the actions of all the nations 
h d  mitigating the conflicts which today could destroy 
our world. Leaving aside the positive achievements, of the 
United Nations in the social and humanitarian fields - 
though these, too,'would be sufficient justification for many 
of us - it is only necessary to consider what might have 
occurred if there had been no United Natidns available to 
Step into the anarchic situation in the Congo in the sum- 
mer of 1960 or in the acutely grave situation which arose: 
aver Cuba a short time ago and in some degree still remains, 
Writing about the United Nations and ' its indispensability 
some few months ago, the American permanent delegate 
ti, the United Nations said: "We cannot undo the world 
which science is making over to us. With or without an 
mbryonic instrument of international order, ' .the over- 
whelming need for order remains. It is written into our 
conquest of space, our instant communication, our common 
neighbourhood of potential atomic death." We were only 
too keenly aware of the common neighbourhood of poten- 
tial atomic death two weeks ago. We are not entitled to 
claim that the United Nations alone then saved the peace. 
But there is no question that the United Nations played 
an invaluable role in focussing the world-wide demand 
for a peaceful but honourable solution of the problem, in 
helping the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United 
States to withdraw from the edge of disaster and at least 
opening the way for the peaceful resolution of the points 
at issue. Now perhaps with greater conviction and feeling 
than ever, we can say: if we had no United Nations it 
would be necessary to invent one. 
But that does not mean that the United Nations is all 
gain and no loss; that it does not register failures as well 
as achievements. It does not mean thatethe United Nations 
is above criticism. Above all it does not mean that the 
United Nations is guaranteed immortality; that it does not 
face dangers that could be mortal to it in &tain circum- 
stances. It could suffer almost as much, I would suspect, 
from its avowed friends as from its avowed enemies - 
from those, that is to say, who judging it incapable of error 
are blind taits weaknesses and above all to the real prob- 
lems which confront it. "This side idolatry" is therefore, I 
suggest, the right stance for the true supporter of the 
United Nations even at this moment when its reputation 
is high, and "this side idolatry" will be what I have to say 
about it. 
The complaints widely expressed against the United 
Nations in the countries of the West - notably by Senator 
Fulbright in the United States and by Lord Home, the For- 
eign Secretary, in my own country - can be broadly sum- 
marized as follows. The countries and governments newly 
acceded to the United Nations - in the main the suc- 
cession States of Asia and Africa - have, it is alleged, 
frequently if not invariably maintained a double-standard 
in their attitude to the major powers of East and West. 
They have turned a blind eye to Soviet imperialism and to 
Communist influence and pressure in general, while main- 
taining a dangerously extreme and irrational opposition to 
the traditional colonial powers (even when these nations 
have been hastening to divest themselves of their colonial- 
ism and have been doing their utmost in the meantime to 
promote economic and political reforms in the areas can- 
cerned). In their obsession with Western colonialism, the 
Afro-Asian majority in the United Nations is using its new- 
found dominance, it i s  argued, to intervene recklessly in 
every so-called colonial situation, to distract the organi- 
zation from its major purpose under the Charter of insur- 
ing international peace and security. In the process they are 
i m p h g  the vital role of the United Nations as mediator 
and conciliator and generally tending to bring disrepute and 
impotence upon the whole organization. Moreover a sit- 
uation is being created, it is said, in which power is being 
divested from responsibility, since by and large the Afro- 
Asian majority is incapable of meeting the growing finan- 
cial necessities of the United Nations, the burden of which 
falls overwhelmingly on the larger states. To this there 
has to be added the more substantial, and perhaps more 
respectable, apprehension provoked not by the behaviour of 
the newer states but by the record of United Nations' inter- 
vention in the Congo. This is the apprehension, felt per- 
ticularly perhaps in the countries of Western Europe - 
and shared, I imagine, to some extent by all of us - that 
the United Nations is being required prematurely to 
shoulder responsibilities beyond its resources and in the 
process to become involved in tasks which exceed its man- 
date and imperil its existence. 
These are weighty charges and they have to be frankly 
faced, however unwarranted or exaggerated we may judge 
them to be. But before looking at them it may be useful 
to stress the extent of the changes within the United Na- 
tions which have given rise to these complaints. There 
were 51 founding-states of the United Nations in 1945. By 
1950, the figure was only 60 whereas to-day-12 years 
later-the tally is 110 member-nations out of, I suppose, 
an immediately possible 115 or thereabouts. Most of the 
increase of 59 states since 1945 has come in fact since 1955 
when the first so-called "package deal" on the admission 
of new members went through. And the increase, of course, 
is mainly in the representation of the new or newer states 
of Asia and Africa. In 1945, of the 51 members of the 
United Nations, 36 came from Europe and the Americas - 
North and South - and only 13 came from Africa, the 
Middle East and Asia. To-day of the 110 members of the 
organization, some 55-that is half - are from the African 
or Asian continents. And correspondingly the percentage of 
the total membership covered by the Americas and Western 
Europe has 'declined from almost 70 per cent in 1945 to 
46 per cent to-day, and, of course, that 46 per cent includes 
a considerable bloc of Latin-American states. 
This change in the composition of the United Nations 
over the last seven years appears even more striking if one 
makes a comparison between the United Nations and the 
old League of Nations. Among the 54 members of the . 
League of Nations there were only six that would have been 
called Afro-Asian today. The United States did not belong. 
The majority was firmly derived from Europe and the 
British Commonwealth. All or most of the leading figures 
in the League were European - Briand, Streseman, Cecil, 
Benes, Politis, Titulesco and the rest. The Assembly was, 
in fact, a European body, reflecting preeminently the 
cultural experience and traditions of Europe. As H. G. 
Nicholas has put it, a trifle cynically: "It was European, it 
was Genevan; it was close, even cosy. It was as foreign as 
was compatible with being international." 
. I am not ou'ering this as a necessarily derogatory com- 
parison, derogatory that is to the United Nations' as we 
know it today. It would be arrogant and absurd to sugg& 
that Europe - with or without the Americas. - had or hasid 
a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue. And onacan say that, 
while regretting, as I do, the decline of European influence 
in the United Nations. The fact is that the centres of world 
influence have been steadily moving since 1922 from 
Europe to~the extremities af East and West, or, looked at 
mother way, have begun, at least, to move from North to 
South and it i s  appropriate and inevitable that the United 
Nations should reflect these changes. Not only that; the, 
W k n i m  principle of self-determination which broughk 
a n w b p  of new sucqemion States into the League of Na- 
tiom after the first World War was exdusivelg Europeaa 
in it3 app3ication. It was not intended to apply to the cob 
Snks m3 ~ p i r e s  of the then great powers. Tbe dependent 
~wntries of M a  and Africa had to wait. for their inde 
n&nw .until the &mtb of the Second World War.. 
one of them is more than 16 years old as an indepen- r 
aent entity; many of them are much newer than that+ 
And sovereignty being what it 19 - and membership of the ' 
United Nations being as it were a hallmark of ,savere&ntg 
-. it is proper and inevitable that these new succession 
States should be in the United Nations and that that body: 
-Id.. increasingly reflect their presence and their in- 
fluence, whether for good or for ill., 
' 
* .Faced then with this decisive shift in the balance of 
. forces @thin the United Nations, and accepting it 'as in- 
evitable, what are we to say about its consequences for the 
life and future of the organization itself? Is it, in fact, true 
that the power now vested in the new succession States - 
which is largely, in fact, a voting power - is being exer- 
cised without responsibility or at least with insufficient re- 
sponsibility in moral and political terms? Is it true that 
the a n t i ~ u E o n ~ t  obsessions of the newly-independent 
S t a b  of Asia and Africa, are rendering them incapable: 
of making a baheed and responsible assessment of issues 
confronting the United Nations - not least those that in- 
wlve the relationships of the great powers of East and 
West? And is it, in fad, correct to say that these reflect 
serious and significant weaknesses in the United Nations 
which urgently need to be remedied? 
There is cpexbin1y some substance in these 
and their implicaa~ns for the future authority as well as 
the present usefulness of the United Nations are not to be 
under-rated. It is undeniable that in certain situations the 
Afro-Asian states, perhaps particularly the new African 
states, have at times allowed their obsessive anti-colonial- 
ism to distort their judgments and lead them into acts of 
discrimination and irresponsibility which must weaken the 
constructive influence of the United Nations and could 
ultimately therefore threaten their own proper interests 
and aspirations. Even if one now forgets their equivocal 
attitude over Hungary six years ago, how else can one 
characterize - whatever the merits of the Indian case - 
except as discriminatory, the totally uncritical connivance 
o f  most of the Afro-Asian delegations in the undoubted 
breach of the Charter involved in Mr. Nehru's military 
attack on Goa? How else can one characterize the attitude 
of  the Afro-Asian group in respect of the situation in 
Southern Rhodesia at the special General Assembly of last 
summer in arbitrarily amending the rules of procedure of 
the Assembly and in supporting measures which could only 
hinder an agreed and peaceful solution of the problem, if 
not positively encourage the risk of violence and blood- 
shed in yet another African area? Or to take a third ex- 
ample, how else can one characterize the virtually total 
indifference on the part of the newer States to the restraints 
upon personal and political freedom in Ghana side by side 
with vehement and constant repudiation of apartheid in 
South Africa? There are other cases and similar instances 
which could be cited where some of the newly-independent 
States within the United Nations have displayed rather 
less than adequate responsibility in discharging their func- 
tions within the organization. 
It is essential therefore not to ignore these aberrations 
nor to minimize their importance. The Afro-Asians, after 
all, are rapidly becoming the dominant group in the As- 
sembly; the veto, it is sometimes said, is passing from the 
hands of the great powers into their hands and the future 
of the organization must depend in a very real sense on 
their capacity to exercise their position with discretion and 
impartiality. The dangers must not be minimized, therefore, 
but they need not be exaggerated either. The outlook may 
be more promising in this respect and the record, in fact, 
less disturbing than Western critics have been prepared to 
allow. Anti-colonialism, as understood in this context is, 
we may hope, a dying issue anyway. There will soon be no 
colonialism left outside the Communist world. When that 
time comes - and it is coming rapidly - the newer States 
must chastise the former colonial powers,' if they wish to 
chastise them at all, with other scorpions. One may hope, 
indeed, that then they and their former master? will be able 
to confront together the multifarious international prob- 
lems that lie on the other side of colonialism; beyond that 
is the liquidation of the last remnants of the old European 
empires. 
Meanwhile, whatever their aberrations, the newer 
States are entitled to more credit than they are often given 
for their actual achievements within the United Nations. 
Without their assistance it would, in fact, have been im- 
possible in the grave crisis that followed the death of Mr. 
Hammarskjold, to defeat the Soviet attempt to put an 
end to all independent executive action by the United Na- 
tions and to secure at least for the time being the appoint- 
ment of an acting Secretary-General with no diminution of 
hisauthority. Lefttothemselves,thegreatpowersofEast - 
and West could not have resolved this deadlock. The con- 
tinuance of an independent, responsible Secretariat was 
made possible because the great majority of the United 
Nations, including virtually all the new Asian and African 
States, would not go along with "an emasculated organi- I, 
zation." And even on the specific issue of colonialism, as 
many commentators have pointed out, no charge of uni- 
versal irresponsibility can properly be laid against the new dl  
States. More often than not in the last twelve months when 
l I i
colonial issues have arisen -in the debates, for example, 2'4 I
on the resolution calling for a rapid end to colonialism, I-! 
on the proposal to expel South Africa from the organization, 
on Cuba's earlier charges against the United States, on the - ,  
., 
virtual Soviet demand for out-and out-war against Katanga I 
1 K 
- on all these questions, the votes and influence of the $4 
majority of the new States were thrown against extreme 
, , 
proposals coming from the Soviet bloc or elsewhere and in dk 
favour of the more moderate resolutions which were in- '? ,; 
variably and overwhelmingly adopted. $ #d 
In the light of this over-all record of the newly inde- ;3 
pendent States within the United Nations, we are perhaps 
entitled to regard the immoderate attitudes and actions 
' i f 
into which on occasion their anti-colonialism has led them, 
as transient phenomena likely to end with the liquidation \ 
of Western colonialism and with the increasing experience 4 L 
and maturity of the new states themselves. The process t 
I S  
will take time but it will not necessarily be prolonged and 
the outcome seems certain. It may well emerge in a better 1 4 
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United Nations than one dominated and deadlocked by the 
unqualified conflict of the great powers. 
Less predictable, perhaps, is the outcome of the con- 
troversy that has arisen, not least in my own country, over 
United Nations' actions in the Congo and the implicit ques- 
tion of the peace-keeping role of the organization in the 
future. Here I am not concerned, of course, with the 
extreme dissent of a Soviet Government which found its 
own freedom of action severely curtailed by United Nations' 
intervention in the Congo nor with the more sophisticated 
and subtle opposition of groups, in Britain and in Belgium 
in particular, fearful of the effects of United Nations poli- 
cies on their economic and financial interests in the Congo. 
My concern is rather with the questions raised by avowed 
friends of the United Nations broadly in agreement with 
its necessary interventions in the Congo situation. These 
reflect serious doubts as to aspects of United Nations policy 
and action in the Congo and fears, in particular, of the 
organization being involved in this and similar situations 
maybe in the future, beyond its available power and au- 
thority. 
These again are legitimate apprehensions and they 
have to be taken seriously. They were felt most acutely 
and properly at the time of the open clash between the 
United Nations forces and the Katanganese army, in and 
around Elizabethville, in September, 1961. They have been 
renewed and reinforced from time to time when it has 
seemed that the United Nations' forces were being drawn 
despite resolutions to the contrary, beyond the responsi- 
bility of restoring public order and preventing civil war, 
into the implicit, if not explicit, task of imposing a political 
settlement in the dispute between the Central Congolese 
Government and the Katanga provincial administration. 
It is not necessary to reject on pacifist grounds all use of 
force by the United Nations to believe that making war 
for the sake of peace is an expedient to be used only in the 
last resort - particularly by the United Nations. Admitted- 
ly, too, the problem of drawing the line between the exer- 
cise of a police function and the imposition of a given po- 
litical settlement has been needlessly complicated by the 
confusing instructions at times issued to its representatives 
in the field by the Security Council and by the scarcely- 
disguised desire of some of its members to have the United 
Nations impose a given political solution without more 
ado. All this is simply an acknowledgement of the fact 
that in a situation unique for the United Nations, the action 
of the organization has been inevitably experimental and 
not without its misjudgments and mistakes. 
arc 
Even so, who would doubt that given the nature of 
the Congo crisis in the summer of 1960 it was providential 
that the United Nations was at hand to step into the situa- 
tion? And who would doubt that broadly its intervention 
has been helpful and effective? It is true that there is still 
some considerable way to go before the aims of the United 
Nations in the Congo are fully achieved. Certainly much 
more has to be done before the Congo becomes effectively 
independent in political and economic terms. But much 
also has been achieved towards stabilising the internal 
situation. Congolese statesmen are progressively taking 
charge of their own affairs, and a large program of inter- . 
nationally-sponsored technical training and assistance 'is 
in operation. Given reasonable good fortune the Congo will, 
in time, achieve a genuine independence and become a 
going economic and political concern. 
In any case, however partial the achievements to date 
of the United Nations in the Congo may be, we cannot 
exaggerate the importance of having available some means 
whereby the world community can "intervene in the name 
of non-intervention," in situations where the collapse of 
one system of power and the weakness of the new incum- 
bent makes the rival interventions of other parties only 
too easy and perilous. The points of dissolving power are 
after all among the danger-points of our world today and 
it is precisely there - at those points - that the contribu- 
tion of the United Nations is irreplaceable and indispen- 
sable. No less indispensable, we can now say in the light of 
recent events, is its role in "defusing" explosive situations 
between the great powers themselves and making possible 
the pursuance of negotiated settlements. 
All this seems to me to make abundantly clear that it 
is a prime duty and interest of the Governments and peoples 
of the West and notably of your country and mine, to make 
energetic support of the United Nations a cardinal aim of 
international policy. To suggest this is not to propose the 
abandonment or the disregard of other aims and loyalties 
in the international field whether it is the integrated 
Western Europe or the Atlantic Community or American - 
hemispheric collaboration or anything else. These are, 
or ought to be, complementary aims - each to the other. 
and both to the United Nations - safeguarded, in the case. 
of the regional organizations, against their divisive impli- 
cations by being developed within the wider framework of 
a universal co-operation. Nor, of course, is it to urge or- 
expect the Governments of the West, or ourselves, to sus- 
pend all critical judgment where the actions of the United 
Nations are concerned. It is, rather, to acknowledge that the 
supreme interest of the Western powers is to strengthen 
the United Nations so as to enable it progressively to take 
up on behalf of the international community, the strain of 
the new crises inevitably going to be placed on the world 
organization in a period of rapid historical change. And it 
is to recognise that it is not least the interest and duty of 
the Western nations to be unmistakably on the side of the 
United Nations because the whole concept of an all-embrac- 
ing organization - "the property of all but mastered by 
none" - and serving the unideological interest of the 
eommon man everywhere, is still basically under challenge 
from the Communist world. 
This involves much more from our governments - or 
again from ourselves as individuals - than a benevolent 
neutrality towards the United Nations. It is not enough for 
the Western great powers - the one-time masters of the 
United Nations - to sit on the side-walk, as it were, nurs- 
ing their hurt pride, lamenting their lost dominance and 
saying "Ah! well - the Club is not what it was." If their 
lofty declarations of fidelity to the United Nations are to 
mean anything they have to develop a dynamic policy to- 
wards the organization directed alike to remedying its 
weaknesses and utilising more fully its assets and possibili- 
ties. They have the obligation to clear their minds as to the 
executive functions they desire the United Nations to per- 
form - to determine how much "operational cGpacity" 
they are prepared to see it develop - and having reached 
these decisions, to put their power and authority behind its 
effective action in a given situation without equivocation 
and delay. As far as remedying the weaknesses of the 
United Nations i s  concerned I would say two things: first 
to repeat that, as regards the weaknesses due to the im- 
maturity and inexperience of the newer states, time can be 
expected to put that right. Second, I would suggest that. 
a dynamic policy towards the United Nations would also* 
require Western governments to be less apathetic than 
they have been towards the obvious anomalies in the United 
Nations today and the fact that little or no attempt has 
yet been made to adapt the status quo at the United Nations 
itself to the new balance of power. This is not, of course, 
to suggest the Charter revision which is excluded by the 
impossibility of securing great power agreement. But it 
is to suggest that something might be done - short of 
treaty-made, structural adjustments - to brag  the make- 
up of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council 
and the rest more into harmony with the facts of inter- 
national life and more representative of a United Nations 
wbich has doubled its membership and in many ways trans- 
€armed its character since 1945. 
As for utilising more fully the assets and possibilities 
of the United Nations, this leads me to say a few words 
finally about the evolution of the organization and the 
nature of the responsibilities it can and should undertake 
in the future. Here I am still thinking particularly about 
the attitude and responsibilities of the Western Govern- 
ments or the Western great powers. Broadly as it seems 
to me, they have to be with Dag Hammarskjold in his re- 
jection of a purely conservative - even minimal - esti- 
mate of the future role of the organization. They must 
envisage the United Nations as he did, not as "a static 
machinery" but as a gromng organism, an evolving institu- 
tion, developing slowly but surely something of a supra- 
national status and authority, "a dynamic instrument of 
govei-nments" expressing itself in f o w  of executive ac- 
tisn and permeated in all its dealings ana especially in 
the demeanour of its Secretariat with a spirit of objectivity 
in harmony with the principles laid down in the Charter. 
And I imagine that most of us here would favour this con- 
cept, too, if only because it at least makes possible the pro- 
gressive building-up of the framework of world order or 
world government which has become essential in the nu- 
clear age if our world is to survive. 
Granted the validity of such a concept, it is still 
legitimate to ask, without depreciation of Hammarskjold's 
immense service to the United Nations, whether, in fact, 
his use of the United Nations in the Congo - imposed upon 
him largely though it was by the circumstances themselves 
- did not dangerously overstrain the capacities of the 
organization and incidentally involve an over-concentration 
of power in one person and in one place. Certainly for the 
future the Western Governments have the duty to recognise 
and urge others to recognise, that even a United Nations 
accepting the role - to quote U Thant - of "agent and 
moderator of historic change," has to fulfill that task within 
existing limitations and that to try and take its executive 
action too fast and too far may be to imperil its existence 
altogether as an all-embracing organization. And one of 
the main limitations that has to be recognized is the ob- 
vious fact that the Communists are there, as well as the 
non-Communists and the non-aligned, and that all three 
must continue to be there if the organization is to miti- 
gate the conflicts that divide our world and to stand in re- 
serve at moments of crisis such as we have recently en- 
countered. I have been at the United Nations on and off 
since 1950 and I know only too well the price the organi- 
zation has had to pay in terms of frustrated action by the 
presence and the veto of the Communist bloc. Nobody 
knows 'precisely what their objectives are in the United 
Nations - they may not even know precisely themselves. 
They may intend or hope ultimately to supplant it with a 
Communist world organization. They may hope, that is, 
to capture it and even to kill it as the kind of organization 
both the Charter and Hammarskjold envisaged it to be. 
But in the meantime they have to operate in it as it is, like 
everyone else; and like quite a number of other states which 
have from time to time found themselves at odds with the 
United Nations, they have decided that it is inconceivable 
that they should leave it. They have just now, in fact, been 
obliged in regard to Cuba to acknowledge its value and 
utilize its services. A year ago, thanks, as I said earlier, to 
the attitude of the smaller countries, they were obliged 
to accept defeat on the question of the troika - the three- 
headed Secretary-General. They have been obliged, too, 
to  realise that the smaller countries in the United. Nations 
are sick to death of the cold war and of having their con- 
structive aims and purposes constantly bedeviled by it. 
It may therefore be true that the prospect of a some- 
what more cooperative era in the United Nations is at 
hand. Certainly it seems clear to me that we have to make 
up our minds whether it is not better on balance, to have 
the Communists - the U.S.S.R. in particular - in the 
organization. I do not have much doubt that it is. But if 
we are going to acknowledge that, then we have to ack- 
nowledge, too, that it cannot be a predominantly American 
United Nations or a predominantly British United Nations 
or even a predominantly Afro-Asian United Nations. There 
must be a willingness to give the Eastern bloc countries . 
their appropriate strength in the Secretariat and their a p  
propriate say in the councils of the organization. This is 
the price we pay for a universality which, I think,. is indis- 
pensable. It  is also the price we pay for the recognition, 
.which is forced upon us, that there is no prospect of the 
United Nations developing in the foreseeable future into a 
real and independent centre of power. ~robebly, it is true 
to say, the world becomes less rather than more adapted 
to a centralised global control. The United Nations, in 
other words, will remain by and large the centre for the 
harmonizing by pragmatic means of the activities of nations 
on the widest possible basis. This purpose will involve as 
much diplomacy as executive action and in this diplomacy 
the United Nations cannot and will not succeed unless it 
is at least in some measure a common instrument of East 
and West. 
I would end therefore where I began, emphasizing a 
realistic approach to the United Nations, the need to recag- 
nize its limitations, to use it as it is and to base its develop- 
ment on pragmatic rather than visionary grounds. I be- 
gan with a quotation from Adlai Stevenson; perhaps I 
may end with one. "This present U.N." he said, in the 
same article from which I quoted earlier, "is just about all 
the law and order our anarchic world will swallow to- 
day. If we are to advance to higher standards or greater 
security we must work on patiently from the spot we have 
already reached and not jettison our few working examples 
of genuine international action in favour of something more 
ideal - which we shall not get - or more innocuous, which 
will not meet our needs. What we have is man's first sketch 
of the world society he has to create. He can build better 
than this - so much is obvious. But will he go on building 
at all if we are forever tearing up the foundations? The 
experiment of living together as a single, human family 
is more likely to grow from precedent to precedent, by 
experience and daily work and set-backs and partial suc- 
cesses, than to spring utopian and fully-formed from the 
unimaginable collective agreement of world minds. Let 
us go on with what we have. Let us improve it whenever 
we can. Let us give it the imaginative and creative support 
which will allow its authority to grow and its peace-mak- 
ing capacities to be more fully realised." 
Perhaps this is a peculiarly relevant moment to recall 
these words and to affirm their appeal. 
Chapter 3 
THE DEEPER CHALLENGES OF COMMUNISM 
The objective appraisal of Communism which as 
Christians we are required to make must begin with a rec- 
ognition of the validity, so to speak, of Communism - an 
acknowledgment of the things in Communism which 
would seem to be true, whether positively or negatively. 
First and foremost we can acknowledge as good the im- 
pulses and purposes of Communism insofar as these are 
directed to the elimination of social evils and in particu- 
lar to the ending of poverty and exploitation. We can 
recognize what John C. Bennett calls "the significance of 
its claim to stand for a new order of justice and equality." 
We can recognize, too, the value of its emphasis on the 
group purpose as a proper reaction to a self-seeking and 
self-centred individualism. We can acknowledge and ad- 
mire the single-mindness with which very often these nur- 
poses are pursued. We can recognize, too, at this level, 
and perhaps with some apprehension, the strength of its 
appeal to the so-called "backward" peoples and "backward'? 
countries, if only as a technique for rapidly overcoming 
their timeless poverty and wretchedness. 
Secondly, we have to acknowledge the positive achieve- 
ments of Communism in the social, economic and techno- 
logicaI advance of the Soviet Union since 19 17, particularly 
in the last five to ten years and at least in the beginnings 
of a similar advance, since 1950, in mainland China. We 
might have to question Soviet estimates of the debt Russian 
progress owes to Communism, recalling that Russia's in- 
dustrial revolution was in fact well under way in 1917. We 
certainly have to take into account the tremendous cost in 
human misery which both the Soviet and Communist China 
revolutions have involved, and judge for ourselves how far 
so terrible a price for. progress has been morally justified. 
We can recall that Stalin, in the case of Soviet Russia, in- 
flicted almost limitless physical suffering on the Russian 
people. We can recognize with Robert Guillain, the dis- 
tinguished French journalist who knows Communist China 
well, that the progress made in China in the last twelve 
years has been achieved "at the cost of the substitution of 
mental poverty for physical poverty" and of what he calls 
"the death of the cultivation'of the mind." 
But even so, it has to be acknowledged that there have 
been real social and economic gains for the Soviet. people 
which have given them rewards and satisfactions, not all 
of them strictly economic, unheard of in the past. The 
social and economic gains of the revolution to date for the 
Chinese people, are much more difficult to estimate, if only 
because of the severe natural disasters they have had to 
meet in the last three or four years. There a,#e some who 
would deny any gains at all. Certainly what has been 
gained in China has been achieved at the price of spiritual 
and political freedoms which we in the West regard, or 
profess to regard, as precious - though admittedly most 
Chinese in the past knew little about them anyway. But 
China is effectively unified for the first time in generations. 
There is no overt civil war. There are no rampaging w a s  
lords. The administration at all levels i s  surprisingly 
honest. Corruption has largely disappeared and gone, too, to 
uote GuiW again, are "the smells, the squalor, the rags, %e beggars and the W." Economic standards are still 
desperately low according to Western criteria, but there 
is a measure of price stability and the signiiicance of this 
last, of the victory over infiation, can scarcely be exag- 
gerated in view of the experience of the Chinese. There 
i s  no question moreover that the present government in 
China has the people fully behind it in one of its major 
purposes, which is to check "the decay of empire," to put 
an end to what is called the national humiliation of one 
hundred years of domination and penetration by foreign 
powers, and to establish an unquestionably independent, 
sovereign and great China. 
Thirdly we can acknowledge that, whatever may be 
the errors in Cor]nmunisrn, "the lie in Communism," to use 
Berdyaev's phrase, there is a truth or at least a hall-truth 
in the basic theories of Communism in their stress on the 
significance of economic or material factors in the human 
situation. If it is true, as we here believe it is, that man 
does not live by bread alone, it is no less true that he cannot 
live without it. To quote John C. Bennett again: "Without 
a minimal economic security, all else - his art, his philoso- 
phy, his music, his politics, even his religion becomes im- 
possible." And that, of course, is incidentally a basic Christ- 
ian premise also. We do not deny as Christians the exist- 
ence and importance of the material. On the contrary, 
perhaps the supreme message of Christianity is that the 
material and spiritual are one and indivisible and that 
the only fatal thing is to try to divide them. We can ack- 
nowledge, in other words, that whatever its limitations, the 
economic or materialistic interpretation of history which 
is the basis of Marxism has sewed and served usefully to 
correct purely idealized conceptions of life and of religion 
which have failed to recognize this unity of the material 
and the spiritual. 
Fourthly and lastly, in the realm of acknowledgments, 
we can recognize the validity of much of the Communist 
indictment of the professedly Christian and democratic 
West in its failure to live up to its own ideas and ideals of 
freedom and fraternity. To this, I shall return before I end, 
contenting myself here with saying that, if Berdyaev's re- 
mark that Communism is "a poison born out of the short- 
comings of Christians," i s  true in the literal and historical 
sense, in terms, that is, of the mid-nineteenth century ori- 
gins and inspirations of Marxism, it is still only too true 
unfortunately in terms of much of the contemporary world, 
in terms of the challenges of Communism to our own faith- 
lessness and our own weaknesses today. "The new Com- 
munist world," as an ex-China missionary has written, "is 
a judgment on our old world." 
These acknowledgments require the ~hristian to be 
humble and constructive in his approach to Communism. 
But they do not entitle him to ignore or underestimate the 
issues that separate Communism from Christianity or that 
separate for that matter the Communist systems and ways 
of life, or to disguise hPm himself and others that at vital 
points they are in profound conflict with each other. It is  
necessary, of course, to avoid the easy hypocrisy which 
compares Communist practice with Christian theory, with 
Christian ideals which are never realized or even seriously 
attempted. But if there i s  a truth and a lie in CommuniS~#, 
we must recognize and acknowledge the lie as frankly as 
we accept the truth. We have not to be so filled with toler- 
ance and sentimentality that we cannot distinguish good 
from evil, or if you like, relative "goods" from each other. 
For if we are so obsessed with self-criticism as to be in- 
capable of perceiving the essential errors of Communism, 
we betray our Christian duty for one thing, and for another 
we disqualify ourselves for promoting whatever possibili- 
ties there are of an ultimate synthesis which takes and 
makes the best of both worlds. 
What then is the lie in Communism, judged not in 
abstract terms but in terms of the nature of the system 
and its essential defects and disabilities as seen from a 
Christian and Western democratic standpoint - if I may 
put these things together without pretending to equate 
them? I am not myself inclined to establish the difference 
between Christianity and Communism on the acknow- 
ledged atheism of Communism. True, the fundamental 
error of the central philosophies of CommuniGm is  that 
they leave out God. True, too, that this is not simply a 
theoretical idolatry with no practical consequences. But 
there is so much practical idolatry, too, in the societies of 
the West, so much practical atheism, so much effectual 
and consistent denial of God by those who profess to ack- 
nowledge him, including ourselves, that I would hesitate 
to characterize this as the decisive frontier between the 
Communists and ourselves. I remember a striking broad- 
cast by Karl Barth in the early stages of the Second World 
War in which he said: "Never forget that the godlessness 
that crucified Christ was not the theoretical godlessness of 
the atheist but the practical godlessness of' the pious." Nor 
would I find it easy to establish the distinction between the 
two systems in the rejection by Communism of absolute 
values. Unfortunately the expediency that subordinate$ 
means to ends is not an exclusive Communist phenomenon; 
as the history of religious persecution shows. And even 
today countries professing to accept and respect Cbistiaq 
values are prepared, however reluctantly, to inflict on the 
pe~ples of other countries the unspeakable horrors of 
$h~rmonuclear war. As long, therefore, as Christians are 
ready, with Communists, to justify any measures neces- 
sary to ensure .victory or avoid defeat in war: or in revolu- 
tion, the exclqsive claim to absolute moral ~tandards is 
m. difficult to sustain. 
There are in my own country, and maybe here too; 
those who, facing these facts, would go so far as to say 
that there is little or nothing to choose between ourselves 
and the Communists in the matter of the commission of 
evil deeds. All the barbarities of the Communists, they 
would say, can be matched by the barbarities of the darkest 
periods of early British capitalism and colonialism - of 
our Industrial Revolution and empire-building. And again 
are we not, they say, alike in both East and West in our 
willingness to commit actions, in the last resort, unpre- 
d e n t e d  in their barbarism and violence? However exact 
or inexact these parallels may be, it is useful to have our 
consciences stirred, our tendency to self-righteousness dis- 
turbed in this way. But those who make this point are 
not entitled to overlook the very distinction which enables 
them not only to challenge our self-righteousness, but to 
protest against the evils committed or proposed to be com- 
mitted in our name. In the darkest period of the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain, voices were raised in determined 
protest against its social consequences. Men and women 
laboured devotedly to correct its more flagrant evils. They 
roused the public and the private conscience, as indeed clid 
Karl Marx himself writing his Communist Manifesto in 
1848 in the British Museum. In 1962 other men and women 
in my country march from Aldermaston or sit down in 
Trafalgar Square, or in this country engage in a vigil out- 
side the White House or the United Nations - all of them 
in order to protest against the barbarities implicit in nuclear 
war and nuclear war preparation. It was Frenchmen, as 
has been pointed out, who denounced what Frenchmen did 
in Algeria; it was Americans who put a stop to McCarthy; 
it was Englishmen who brought the Black and Tan atro- 
cities in Ireland to an end; and to come nearer to our own 
time, it was Englishmen who reversed or helped to reverse 
our aberration over Suez in 1956.' 
These protests are made today as they were made ten, 
forty or one hundred years ago within the framework of 
a political system that allows for criticism, disagreement 
and dissent, within a society where the public,' and private 
conscience, are allowed to exist. That they are not per- 
mitted, as yet, to exist under Communism - one only 
dissents from or repudiates the excesses of Stalinism when 
it is safe and expedient to do so - is,'I suggest, the crux 
of tha'difference between a Communist society and a free 
society, and an index perhaps of "the root malignancy" 
in Conimunism. For the essence of the free society, and 
its safeguard, is in the recognition that there are rights 
essentially of a moral character - belonging to the human 
person that are not to be abrogated or over-ruled by claims 
of state. It is this that makes the free society, as distin- 
guishable from the conscience-re j ecting system of totali- 
tarian Communism, indispensable to the Christian. Be- 
cause without the recognition of conscience - as John 
Middleton Murry wrote: "there can be no assurance of 
justice, of legality, of toleration or even of decency; there 
can be no adequate safeguards against despotism, no moral 
as distinct from political protest against anything and ul- 
timately no freedom of the human spirit." 
Having said this I would cautiously add that while 
this is still the vital difference between the societies of 
East and West, the gap between them - at least the gap 
between the Soviet Union and the West - is slowly 
but perceptibly narrowing. I am not here thinking pri- 
marily of the fact that thanks to the rapidly increasing 
industrialisation of the Soviet Union, the development 
there of a bourgeois technocracy and the emergence of an 
educated elite for whom the October Revolaion is hear- 
say and not actual experience, there is an ever-increasing 
approximation, in economic aims and structures if not in 
social purpose, between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. I have in mind rather the fact that the demand 
for greater freedom in moral and spiritual terms, for a 
respite from the permanent revolution and its pressures, 
is growing in the Soviet Union and at least in a measure, 
obliging its rulers to relax their grip on the Soviet people. 
The extent of the relaxation has not to be exaggerated. 
"The Soviet Union has not yet abandoned," to quote a 
symbolic phrase of Raymond Aron's, "the fight against 
heretics." It may still be quite a long way from doing so 
and a reaction is still possible in the meantime. But at 
least a beginning has been made and the first visible steps 
towards a greater tolerance taken. Given the absence of 
acute international crisis and a growing intercourse at all 
levels between the peoples of the West and the peoples 
of Russia, the process seems likely to continue and to 
develop. It may be pertinent to remind ourselves that 
after all the Russians and the Chinese are broadly after 
the same things as ourselves. For them, as for us, the de- 
clared goals are social equality, the transcendence of class 
divisions, the abolition of poverty and insecurity, and "the 
emergence of the whole community into the foreground 
of political action" - in short, real democracy. It could 
be that beneath the many and the real divergencies and 
the bitter conflicts of our time, East and West are moving 
slowly toward the same ends and a similar society - a 
better society than we yet know in either East or West. 
My final observation would relate then to the re- 
sponsibility of Western societies and especially to that of 
the Christian individual within them, in face of the Com- 
munist challenge. It is to say that, of course,. we do not 
defend our essential Western values against the challenge 
of Communism by destroying them either in a military or 
a non-military conflict with Communism. We cannot win 
in the moral encounter with Communism by giving it the 
victory in our own hearts - by approximating, that is, 
Western aims and methods to Comrnunist aims and Corn- 
munist methods. We win, if at all, in the non-military en- 
counter with Communism by concentrating not so much 
on the errors and the evils of Communism as on the de- 
ficiencies and failures of the Western world. We turn our 
scrutiny from the Communists to ourselves, recognizing 
that we in the West are not quite as moral as we some- 
times claim to be nor the Communists quite as immoral 
as we sometimes think they are. Above all we try to fill 
the vacuum of faith with a renewed faith of our own. Only 
too often we seem to be trying to meet the poison in Com- 
munism by absorbing it into our own systems, by prac- 
tising in our own countries and communities the very evils 
we denounce in it. If in the proposed defence of prized 
liberties against the assaults of Communism, we destroy or 
curtail our own freedom of opinion, our own right to speak 
and to differ freely like free men, we are well on the way, 
in any case, to losing out to Communism. Or if all we seem 
concerned about in the West is out-bidding, out-rivalling 
Communism in a practical materialism, in creating a para- 
dise of consumer goods, we are doomed and defeated even 
before we start; because as Barbara Ward has pointed out, 
the materialism (namely Communism) that believes in it- 
self is bound to win out against a materialism like ours that 
is apologetic and shame-faced knowing itself to be denying 
the very essence of the values for which it professes to 
stand. "The trial of soul we face today," said this same 
writer recently, "is to out-dream the Communist visionaries, 
out-work the Communist fanatics and out-dare the voices 
of defeatism and discouragement within our own society. 
This is precisely the challenge which Western man again 
and again in his millennia1 record, has met and measured 
and triumphantly overcome." Let us hope she is right. 

Chapter 4 
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE - HOPE OR DELUSION? 
I want to discuss with you this evening what we com- 
monly call the East-West problem in its more immediate 
aspects, and to do this on the basis of an objective examina- 
tion of the meaning and the potentialities of what we have 
come to know as "peaceful coexistence." Merely to under- 
take this examination is judged unfriendly by the Com- 
munists. The concept of peaceful coexistence has no am- 
biguities for them and anyone who wants to probe into its 
meaning, even if only to understand it better must, as 
they see it, be wanting to maintain "the cold war" and to 
discourage the prospect of a new era of peace. 
Even so, we must not be deterred. After all, it is the 
Communists themselves who are not only vigorously pro- 
moting the idea of peaceful coexistence but also carefully 
prescribing its limits and possibilities. Those to wham it 
is offered as a specific. for peaceful relations between East 
and West, are not only entitled but required to know what 
i t  really means or the ultimate confusion and danger may 
be worse than the first. How much or how little "peace" 
does it entail? Does it mean that if military force is now 
a vacuum, the vacuum is to be filled with war of another 
kind? Is the Soviet Union simply offering the West sub- 
stitutes for war aimed, in Max Ascoli's phrase, "at the end- 
ing of coexistence in its favour?" Or is it an invitation to 
a genuinely peaceful competition in well-being - the well- 
being not only of the peoples of the Soviet Union .and the 
West but of-others as well? Does it offer, that is to say, 
a basis for a new and constructive relationship between 
East and West? And, last but not least, if it is to provide 
such a basis, what does it require not only from the East 
but from the West in turn? 
We shall be in a better position, perhaps, to answer 
these questions if we first define our terms and, in particu- 
lar, if we try to see what peaceful coexistence means io the 
Communists themselves. After all both the concept and 
the phrase itself are Communist in origin and inspiration. 
What does the concept then imply to them? The answer 
can be given in summary form in this way. 
Future history, according to Marxist theory, is already 
determined. The world moves inexorably to a certain goal, 
which is the downfall of capitalism and the universalisation 
of the Communist system. But Rome was not built in a 
. 
day. The process will take time; the interim may well be 
prolonged. And in the interim the two contrasting and 
conflicting systems, Communist and Cap i t aw will exist 
simultaneously; that is to say they will co-exist. Sooner 
or later, said Lenin and Stalin, there is a strong possi- 
bility, if not probability, of military conflict between 
them. (Mr. Khrushchev, appreciating the calamitous im- 
plications of contemporary war, has abandoned ,the as- 
sumption of inevitable military conflict - to which re- 
vision of the doctrine we shall return in a moment). But, 
the argument continues, the Soviet State and the capitalist 
powers cannot merely disengage themselves militarily; 
they must have some sort of positive relations with each 
other, particularly in a shrinking world, and relations that 
are as peaceful as may be. They should develop, therefore, 
on the basis of respect for the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of each other's countries and in a spirit of mutual 
understanding, as much interchange as possible in the trade 
and cultural fields. This, in generalised terms, is the theory 
of peaceful co-existence as enunciated by the Communists 
themselves. 
But, even so, this is not in the Communist view a 
policy for all time. Whether war is or is not an inevitable 
element in the process, peaceful co-existence remains a 
strictly provisional concept. It involves no abandonment, 
no modification even, of the ultimate aim which is the total 
and final vindication and triumph of Communism. On the 
contrary, not the least of the justifications for peaceful co- 
existence in Communist eyes, is that it makes the realisa- 
tion of the ultimate aim less risky, and more certain. As 
the declaration of the eighty-one Communist Parties after 
their Moscow meeting of December, 1960, expressed it: 
"Peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social 
systems does not mean conciliation of the socialist and 
bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it implies intensi- 
fication of the struggles of the working class, of all the 
Communist parties for the triumph of Socialist ideas." In 
short, peaceful co-existence is a means to an end, not an end 
in itself, and the ends it is destined to serve remain un- 
equivocally and uncompromisingly Communist. 
How much peace is there, then, in peaceful co-existence 
so defined? Before suggesting an answer to the question 
let me follow up for a moment the implications of Mr. 
Khrushchev's revision of the doctrine, since this raises the 
important dserences that have developed on these issues 
within the so-called "camp of Socialism" itself - between 
in particular the Soviet Union and the People's Republic 
of China. Here again it must be emphasised, it is not the 
formal ends of Communism that are in dispute; the differ- 
ences relate not so much to ends as to means - the methods 
to be used in the building of. Communism and above all 
to the timing of the various phases of the process and the 
speed at which they can be fulfilled. And the dispute has 
many facets. It concerns, where it is a question of the pro- 
gress towards full Communism of a country already under 
Communist rule, the domestic revolutionary strategy of 
Communism. Where relations with the uncommitted world, 
the emerging countries of Asia and Africa, are involved, 
the question is how best to further revolutionary situations 
likely to serve ultimate Communist ends in countries that 
have newly achieved their political independence or are 
on the verge of doing so. The dispute also concerns the 
question of authority within the Communist world - the 
contest for leadership of the Cornrnunist bloc itself. Where 
is the Communist papacy, the Communist Vatican, to be 
located? As Edward Crankshaw once put it: "can you 
have a Communist Byzantium as well as a Communist 
Rome?" 
But above all, the differences between Moscow and 
Peking in these matters relate to the global strategy of 
Communism and its attitude to the non-Communist great 
powers of the West. Since, for both Lenin and Stalin, as 
we have already noted, a violent struggle between the 
Soviet Union and the capitalist powers of the West seemed 
virtually inevitable in the longer run, the purpose of peace- 
ful coexistence for them was to gain time to ensure, if pos- 
sible, that the war would be fought under conditions of 
maximum advantage to the Communist side. Mr. Khrush- 
chev in his revision of the doctrine has not, of course, 
turned to Quaker pacifism. He has not rejected "wars of 
national liberation," that is to say, wars fought by de- 
pendent peoples to gain independence (unless, of course, 
the peoples happen to be dependent on the Communists 
themselves). Nor of course has he rejected the legitimacy 
of revolution. But, recognising the all-embracing destruct- 
iveness of modern warfare and assuming, too, the dec!ine 
of imperialism so-called and the growing strength c~f the 
Socialist camp - a decisive shift, as he sees it, in the world 
balance of power - he insists or has insisted to date that 
military war between the Communist great powers and 
the West must be avoided and that the struggle between 
them must be waged by other means. In the article which 
he contributed to Foreign Affairs about the time of his 
American visit three years ago, he asked: "Wt then is 
the policy of peaceful coexistence? In its simplest expres- 
sion," he replied, answering his own question, "it signi- 
fies the repudiation of war as a means of solving contro- 
versial issues." And to this thesis he has given dramatic 
confirmation in his withdrawal over Cuba. 
This re-writing of Lenin's and Stalin's teaching on 
war and peace and the correct attitude for Communism 
to adopt towards the "imperialist" powers of the West, is 
unacceptable to the People's Republic of China; in fact it 
has been constantly and bitterly attacked by Peking. The 
Chinese Communist leaders pay lip-service to peaceful co- 
existence if only to give the appearance of unity with the 
Russians on this as on other issues; but they are, in fact, 
much more pessimistic than the Russians about making 
the transition to Communism peacefully, whether within 
a given country or in the world at large. They will admit 
that the emergence of a powerful Socialist system has 
weakened the power of imperialism so-called but the im- 
perialists, to quote a not very felicitous phrase from the 
Chinese military journal Red Flag, "have not laid down 
the butcher's knife or abandoned aggression." The 
Chinese will admit, too, that if global nuclear war should 
break out great sacrifices would be imposed on all the 
peoples, but as they see it, it would be imperialism and 
not mankind in general that would be annihilated. And 
then as another Chinese paper put it: "the victorious 
peoples" (that is, one supposes, the Chinese or the Com- 
munists in general) "will build a beautiful future for them- 
selves on the debris of a dead imperialism." The Chinese 
will agree, further, with the Soviet view that thanks to 
Soviet advances in weapon development, the balance of 
power has moved to the advantage of the East against the 
West. But all this in their view provides the opportunity 
and the justification, not for a relaxing of the Communist 
attitude to the outside world, but for driving the advantage 
home, for a more militant and revolutionary worldwide 
Communist posture, not least in the under-developed re- 
gions of the world. 
By and large, these differences in the Chinese and 
Soviet attitudes reflect the relative stages of the two Com- 
munist revolutions. The Soviet revolution is forty-five 
years old; the Soviet Union has reached economic maturity, 
to use the current jargon, or is rapidly doing so. It is de- 
termined to preserve its achievements to date from the total 
destruction of nuclear war. It can even do with a period of 
relaxed international tension, or relative peace - at least 
so that the gains of the revolution can be consolidated and 
the practical benefits of economic maturity be extended 
more widely to the Russian people. The U.S.S.R. 
has everything to gain from a switch to economic as against 
military competition with the West. Its policy, therefore, 
in international affairs, in the political struggle between 
East and West, is broadly still one of consolidation. (There 
is little doubt, I think, that Mr. Khrushchev's over-riding 
purpose in Central Europe is to stabilize the status quo, 
and his insistence on rectifying the particular anomaly 
that is Berlin only underlines this general purpose of tidy- 
ing up and confirming the existing situation in Middle 
Europe .) 
The Chinese revolution, on the other hand, is only 
thirteen years old. It is at what is called the stage of "take- 
off" in economic development; it is moving into its Stalin 
era rather than out of it, like the U.S.S.R. The Chinese 
leaders are trying to modernise China in a generation and 
for this purpose they need all the external tension there 
is, or that can be created, to provide the stimulus necessary 
to maintain the drive forward and to obtain the necessary 
sacrifices from their people. They can scarcely afford a 
period of international tranquillity because their hold on 
the Chinese masses depends on convincing them that they 
are constantly engaged in a ruthless struggle for survival 
against dangerous forces. The major outside enemy - 
American "aggressive imperialism" - must be depicted 
much bigger than life-size; the image of a hostile, imperialist 
world must be maintained. And it must be admitted that 
the People's Republic of China, at least in its own estima- 
tion, is a dissatisfied power. It is deprived, as it believes, 
of its rightful ownership of Formosa (Taiwan) and of its 
rightful title to China's place in the United Nations. Fur- 
thermore the massive obstacle, clearly, to the achievement 
of these political aims is the United States. No peaceful 
coexistence for the Chinese, therefore, if it is to involve 
any easing-off in the domestic or the international struggle. 
So much for the Chinese end, as it were, of the prob- 
lem. What are we to say of Western responsibilities in 
regard to the Soviet Union and Soviet ideas of coexistence 
and co-operation? It has to be said at once that even Mr. 
Khrushchev's definition of peaceful coexistence as simply 
the continuation of political and ideological struggle with- 
out recourse to military war, can hardly be expected to 
raise any great enthusiasm in the Western world. It is 
possible to welcome the emphasis on the neeBto eliminate 
war as a means of resolving East-West differences without 
believing that peaceful coexistence even in the current and 
preferred Soviet definition, provides a sufficient basis for 
a positive cooperation between East and West or promises 
anything in the way of genuine peace. 
The underlying assumptions of peaceful coexistence as 
understood by the Communists are in any case unacceptable 
to all but Communists in the West - or perhaps I ought 
to say, more cautiously, to all but Communists in Great 
Britain. By and large we - the British - do not believe 
that the social systems of the world can be divided and 
neatly docketed into two types, and two types only, de- 
scribed as socialist and capitalist. We do not see this as 
corresponding even to the realities of the situation as it 
is and much less to the situation as we hope and expect 
it to become. What resemblance has capitalism today to 
the laissez-faire of the Victorians - even, dare I say, 
capitalism in the United States? On the other side the 
very disputes within the Communist world make clear 
that even Communists no longer know for sure, or can 
agree among themselves, as to what Communism is. Cer- 
tainly we can say that neither animal is what it was. Nor, 
of course, do we believe in Britain or the United States 
that sooner or later one system - that is the Communist 
system - must necessarily triumph totally over the other 
system or over all other systems if there are more than 
two. Many of us would not even want to assert, I imagine, 
that the Western system - what we call free democracy - 
must necessarily triumph in its present form over Com- 
munism as we know it today. We would prefer to regard 
both Soviet and Western societies as, in some degree, evolv- 
ing societies with constantly changing patterns making pos- 
sible perhaps ultimately, in a new synthesis, a society that 
makes the best of both worlds and fashions it into some 
thing better than we can yet see in East or West. 
But even if we admit, as I think we must, that the 
Communists are right in insisting that the ideological strug- 
gle or the conflict of ideas is inescapable and will continue 
- that, to quote Arnold Toynbee, "the competitive propa- 
ganda of our ideas and ideals must go on9'-we can still in- 
sist that it is all-important to know under what conditions 
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out on -reasonably- -fair and equal ,terms, it. must in . fad 
negate peace and even peaceful coexistence. It is one thing 
to have a straight competition between ways of attaining 
ideals and around the merits of the one -or other socfal 
system - let the best side win - whieb. is the Cormnu&&? 
declared desire. That suits us quite well; it is a very English 
approach. But it is quite another thing if the peoples oh 
one side -have free access to both -sets of ideas' wht1e the' 
peoples on the other have no -such freedom-'at all. 
dialogue, that is to say, can scarcely be effective in a world 
of the jamming of foreign broadcasts, of restrictions on 
access to newspapers and books and information in-general, 
and of officially-limited opportunities of personal contact 
between peoples. It is another thing, too, if the straight 
competition of ideas and of social. philosophies is supple- 
mented and supported not, necessarily, by palpable ag- 
gression or interference but by more subtle methods of in- 
filtration and penetration. ' , 
Clearly too any peaceful coexistence worth the name 
is not compatible, as we have recently seen, with the plat- 
ing of offensive Soviet missile sites in Cuba - virtually in 
the American heartland - since that brought us to the 
edge of war. . It clearly is not compatible with Communist- 
inspired violent sabotage of one sixth of the oil production 
of Venezuela. But at less spectacular levels, it is not com- 
patible with the Communist-inspired promotion of indus- 
trial unrest in Western countries in support of -extreme 
economic demands which must have the effect of dis- 
rupting or gravely damaging the economic life of the com- 
munity. It is not compatible moreover with a constant 
Soviet denigration of Western countries, a consistent dis- 
tortion of their aims and policies and a cynical unwilling- 
ness even to try to comprehend the significance of their 
liberal values and institutions. I; 
A coexistence, then, that has any right to be called 
peaceful, cannot be reconciled with any of these things. 
Indeed if Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues cannot come 
up with a better, more .positive and less ambiguous defini- 
tion of "peaceful coexistence" than this, it is difficult to 
see how the ideological struggle can be carried on peace- 
fully and, above all, how, in the face of the Soviet challenge 
- the challenge of a revolutionary ideology linked with 
massive State power - enough confidence can be engen- 
dered between East and West to make any solid, rnutua 
accord possible. There is no reason, after all, why the 
Western wotld, whatever its desires and need for peace- 
ful accommodations with the Communist states may be; 
should be interested in a coexistence which is a mere 
strategy of the Communist revolution - -g temporary 
phenomenon, that is, pending the universal victory of Com- 
munism. But there is every reason, on the other hand, 
why the West should eagerly welcome and actively pro- 
mote a genuinely peaceful coexistence - even competitive 
one - promising an evolving and, one hopes, improving re- 
lationship between the two si'des. 
What hopes are there, you may well ask, of the Com- 
munists - and I am thinking here of the Soviet Commun- 
ists primarily - changing their spots in this way and abid- 
ing by the conventions of a .manifestly peaceful coexistence 
with or without formal rules? The hopes must certainly 
not be exaggerated. Habits change slowly in East or West, 
and in any case the continuing influence of Marxist dogma 
and doctrine on Soviet policies and attitudes and actions, 
is-still not to be under-rated or despised. But even so in 
the logic of events, in the pragmatism of history as it is 
called, the trends I think - despite the unsolved political 
tensions and the recurring crises - are in fact, all in the 
direction of a more normal, more civilised and more co- 
operative relationship between at least the Russians and 
the West and much has already been achieved in this di- 
rection. "Evidence of ideological apathy," as someone has 
said, "accumulates on both sides of the Iron Curtain." 
Already the pressures of an enforced conformity on the 
Russian people - enforced that is by their own rulers - 
have been sensibly relaxed though by no means removed 
altogether. Already too, there has been a very considerable 
increase over the last five years in cultural contacts, in 
personal intercourse at all levels between the Soviet peoples 
and the peoples of the West, not least between the peoples 
of the United States and Great Britain. Given the absence 
of acute international crisis, there is every expect ation 
that these phenomena will continue and that the processes 
both of normalising the life of the Soviet people and of 
improving the Soviet's external relations with the Western 
world, will go on. 
So far, I have been talking about Soviet responsibility 
for making peaceful coexistence work - for making it 
acceptable to and usable by the West in the interests of a 
genuine move towards peace. But, of course, a peaezful 
coexistence which is to serve a genuinely peaceful purpose 
is a two-way affair, not simply a responsibility of the Com- 
munists themselves. It  demands certain attitudes and calls 
for certain responsibilities from the Western world as 
well. If we in the Western world believe at all in the p a -  
sibility and the necessity of some kind of accommodation 
between East and West (which I would say is indispensable 
if we are to avoid the ultimate disaster of thermonuclear 
war, or to avoid constantly coming to the brink of it), 
then we, too, no less than the Communists will be required 
to do something more than avoid military war with the 
other side. We shall in fact have to abandon, as the Com- 
munists will have to abandon, the policy of all possible 
hostility short of military conflict. If we want a peaceful 
coexistence worthy of the name between East and West, 
we must recognise that some things and some actions on 
our part are compatible with that purpose and some not. 
Admittedly again the difficulties of drawing the line be- 
tween what is permissible and what is not are considerable, 
though the attempt has to be made. Entering a sensitive 
area of discussion for me here - for a foreign visitor on 
American soil - I turn for a moment to illustrate the 
point by reference to policies towards Cuba, making two 
observations on this matter. First, it is certainly com- 
patible with peaceful coexistence that the West, and the 
United States in particular, should do its best to ensure 
that there are no more Cubas in the American hemisphere 
- that the infection of Communism does not spread to the 
mainland of Latin America, though I am convinced that 
ultimately the only effective way to do that is sq to raise 
the economic and social standards of the Latin American 
Republics so as to make them immune to the penetrative 
power of Communism. Of course, I would recognise also 
that the United States and the Organization of American 
States as a whole, must ensure and continue to ensure 
that Cuba is not established as a palpable military threat 
to the security of the United States and its neighbours to 
the South, and that this has to be embraced by any ideas 
of peaceful coexistence that are to be acceptable to the 
Western world. 
But in the second place it has to be said, I think, that 
anything like a genuine peaceful coexistence may require 
of the West, and the United States in particular, not only 
the rejection of a forcible military attempt to destroy Com- 
munism in Cuba, but a virtual acceptance for the time 
being of the status quo in Cuba and a return progressively 
.to something like honnal diplomatic and economic rela+ 
-&ns with Cuba, not least on the supposition that this may 
well be the best way to lessen the Soviet hold over Cuba 
and to win ultimately the politico-ideological s$mggle with 
Sbvkt Communism in a Vlitd area of the worn, These are 
. v q  difficult and controversial questions I -well know, and 
perhaps, as far as American policy is. involved in them, 
outside my competence anyway. But what is unanswerable, 
I think, is that if we want, or believe to be necessary, some- 
thing more than an armed truce between East- and West- 
if we are to be consistent and honest in demanding from 
the- Soviet Union an improved version of their idea of 
peaceful coec~istence - we must ' recognise that this r e  
quires certain -renunciations from us too, and certain posi- 
tive ~bligations as we& 
The stress in what I have been saying up to this point 
has been on what might be called the negative conditions 
of a mutually acceptable peaceful coexistence - on the 
things each side must eschew if a reasonable peaceful and 
honourable relationship is to be established between East 
and West, or at least between the Soviet Union and the 
West. I wouId want to go beyond that so as to hint, at 
least, at a more positive approach to the problems in the 
hope that it may not be impossible to develop peaceful co- 
existence in time into something like an active cooperation 
between the two sides. Recognising what your former 
Secretary of State, Christian Herter, once called the fact 
of "shared interest in the essentials of human welfare and 
everyday life," we should seize every valid opportunity 
of expanding the area of co-operation with the Soviet 
Union or of turning competition into co-operation, as in 
the International Geophysical Year or the development of 
Antarctica or in developing the peaceful uses of atomic 
exiergy or in the handling 6f the problems of outer space 
and in numerous other potential fields. It may be that the 
economic field offers hopeful possibilities of developing 
and normalising Soviet - Western relations, especially 
through the expansion of East-West trade. Perhaps the 
most encouraging development of all on the economic side 
would be an East-West co-operation in organising and ex- 
panding multilateral aid projects to underdeveloped coun- 
tries through the United Nations or even by direct co- 
owrations -between the U.S.S.R. The u.s.A.. and the 
west should go on indicating its readiness for .that even 
though Mr. Khrushchev shows no sign at all at present of 
a willingness to go so far in peaceful co-operation with the 
West. 
On the side of cultural relations between the Soviet 
Union and the West there has already been a notable and 
encouraging development over the last few years, both 
in the more general field of tourist exchanges and in the 
Proliferation of numerous special unofficial and semi- 
official Conferences such as the recent Soviet-American 
Conference held at Andover in this country - in which 
Russians and Westerners have the opportunity of rubbing 
shoulders with each other and of exchanging ideas and 
opinions with at least the beginnings of a greater show of 
flexibility and understanding. 
None of this, it has to be said, will prevent the thermo- 
nuclear war coming if other circumshces are to make it 
inevitable. None of this give and take of peaceful contact 
and developing peaceful cooperation will indeed be pos 
sible if we have to endure a series of recurring crises such 
as the Cuban crisis, and if we still fail to make any tangible 
progress towards political agreements -on the major issues 
dividing the two sides and notably in an initial step to- 
wards real and agreed disarmament. 
No one expects spectacular or rapid progress towards 
these ends in any case, even in the aftermath of the respite 
recently secured. But at least the outcome of that fateful 
week may be that the task of negotiating East-West agree- 
ments is tackled with a new realism and with better pros- 
pects of success than at any time since the Second World 
War ended. I am sure we are more likely to succeed in 
these objectives if, in both East and West, we have thought 
out more clearly these problems of peaceful coexistence 
which I have been discussing, and have faced up frankly 
to the central question: how much peace between East 
and West do we want - or must we have - and what 
price are we prepared and not prepared to pay for it? 
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